The results of Chile’s general election left no one indifferent. Of course, the headlines were dominated by the presidential race, which saw José Antonio Kast emerge as the winner with 27.9% of the vote, followed by Gabriel Boric with 25.8%; both advanced to the runoff. However, regardless of that, it seems to me that the outcome of the parliamentary election takes on a significance that could be even greater for governance over the next four years (provided, of course, that the Constitutional Convention and the subsequent referendum so decide—it goes without saying).
Starting next March, the Chamber of Deputies would be composed of a majority from the current opposition, with 80 deputies belonging to Apruebo Dignidad, Nuevo Pacto Social, and other like-minded parties, which would account for 52% of the votes. Meanwhile, Chile Podemos Más, the Christian Social Front, and other like-minded parties would hold 68 seats, equivalent to 44% of the votes. The People’s Party, which on paper does not belong to any of the aforementioned coalitions, elected 6 representatives, in addition to 1 from Centro Unido. While most of the bills introduced by the Center-Left and the Left could pass through this legislative process, those initiatives requiring special quorums (under the current Constitution) would necessarily require an agreement with lawmakers “from the front.” In fact, neither of the two blocs—even if they were to include congresspeople elected from the People’s Party in their ranks—would reach the 3/5 majority (93 votes), much less the 2/3 majority (103 votes). This leads us to believe that the most controversial proposals from whichever candidate is elected president would have a lower chance of being approved—or, if they are, it would be only after a more cross-party agreement.
For its part, the Senate ended up “tied,” with 25 senators from Chile Podemos Más, the Christian Social Front, and like-minded independents (50%), while Apruebo Dignidad elected 5, Nuevo Pacto Social 17, and other like-minded independents totaled 2. This composition would mean that even ordinary bills would require some kind of agreement with at least one lawmaker from the opposing side—or, in the case of bills requiring high quorums, at least five. This would also foster a more cross-party consensus on the initiatives to be carried out, regardless of who holds the presidency next March.
Of course, the above is not without risks. One possibility is that the executive branch’s political and economic leadership will require significant consensus, but another is that the composition of Congress could lead to legislative gridlock, with one side or the other blocking progress—a situation that would hardly foster stability. Moreover, as analyst Patricio Navia mentioned at our last event, this could lead to significant changes being incorporated into the new Constitution regarding the powers of the state, which might necessitate calling early elections. Amid the turbulent financial climate, this would not be the best news, given the fragility it would reveal in our democracy. Call me naive, but I hope that agreements will prevail and that there will be no further divisions.
Nathan Pincheira
Chief Economist at FYNSA