Fynsa
The TPP-11 is facing the most favorable political climate for its ratification in recent years. The result of the referendum, the need to revive the economy, and a public that is less susceptible to myths and fake news surrounding the agreement have put the TPP in the best position it has ever been in for ratification.
The Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP or TPP11) is the most modern and far-reaching agreement in the Asia-Pacific region—the center of gravity of the global economy—and where Chile has doubled its exports over the past 30 years. The agreement addresses not only tariff issues but also a range of regulatory topics that reflect the new realities of the global economy: services, the digital market, global value chains, and higher environmental and labor standards.
The benefits of the TPP-11 are clear. On the trade front, it improves market access for nearly 3,000 products that previously did not enjoy tariff preferences —such as agricultural, dairy, and seafood products—especially in markets such as Japan, Canada, and Vietnam.
Second, it establishes common rules for a market of nearly 500 million people, representing 13% of global GDP. Third, it incorporates modern rules that are not included in Chile’s bilateral agreements with TPP countries, such as those with Japan and Vietnam, which were signed more than a decade ago.
In any case, the opportunities are also geopolitical Does the country want to be at the table where the future rules of the world’s most dynamic economic zone are being defined? It is no coincidence that this has been understood not only by the eight countries that have already ratified the Agreement (only Malaysia, Brunei, and Chile remain), but also by many others that want to join, such as the United Kingdom, South Korea, Uruguay, and China itself. Furthermore, for Chile, this allows it to diversify its global economic integration, which is heavily dependent on the Chinese and American markets , which account for half of our international trade. Indeed, the TPP does not currently include these two powers.
Driven by an ideological bias against free trade agreements, opponents have tried to spread myths that have been debunked one by one. The latest of these is that the TPP-11 would undermine Chile’s sovereignty, which is not true. The agreement does not compromise Chilean sovereigntybut rather establishes obligations for the State that are inherent to any international agreement creating reciprocal commitments and rights. Furthermore, the mechanism for resolving investor-state disputes is the same international arbitration process used in other agreements signed by Chile. Finally, the TPP-11 itself explicitly states that the government may establish its own regulations and public policies, as New Zealand did with its foreign investment reform, Japan with its amendments to the pharmaceutical law, or Mexico with its labor reform. In no case was the Agreement an obstacle.
Unlike in the past, a majority of the political class, a sector of the government, and—most importantly—the public are more aware of the need to revive the Chilean economy and less susceptible to ideological slogans opposing this agreement. Failing to sign it would amount to nothing more than an ideological whim that would ultimately take a heavy toll on the country’s reputation.
