March 20, 2026 - 3 min

Private debt “under pressure”

The recent cases involving Tricolor and First Brands are testing the resilience of the private debt fund industry and the liquidity of its assets.

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The pressure on large private debt funds is no longer just a theoretical discussion. In 2026, Blue Owl, Blackstone, and BlackRock faced a sharp rise in redemption requests, reigniting the debate over the promise of liquidity in vehicles that invest in essentially illiquid assets. 

For years, private debt was one of the big winners of the financial cycle: attractive rates, direct access to credit, and a narrative of stability amid the volatility of public markets. But in 2026, the model’s most troubling flaw emerged: liquidity. In the first quarter, investors requested redemptions totaling more than $10 billion from large private debt funds, and on average, only about 70% of those requests could be met.  

The problem isn’t just the amount, but what it reveals. Many of these vehicles were marketed as “semi-liquid” alternatives, with periodic redemption windows. However, their portfolios consist of private loans, which are difficult to sell quickly and lack the support of a deep secondary market. When redemption requests rise, the mismatch between promised liquidity and actual liquidity is exposed. In addition to this, it has been observed that the default rate within the industry has shown increased signs of stress, reaching historic highs in a market that has expanded strongly in recent years. This growth is associated with loans tied to the technology sector, which has struggled to meet its obligations. The funds have opted to extend these loans even without any indication of when debtors will be able to repay them. 

Blue Owl became one of the most high-profile cases. In February, the firm restricted redemptions in one of its private credit funds for investors, Blue Owl Capital Corporation II, eliminating the option to request quarterly redemptions and replacing it with periodic capital distributions funded by loan repayments, asset sales, or other transactions.  

This was not an isolated incident. BlackRock limited redemptions in its HPS Corporate Lending Fund after receiving requests equivalent to 9.3% of its assets, but kept the redemption cap at 5%. Blackstone, for its part, faced record redemption requests totaling 7.9% in BCRED, equivalent to approximately $3.8 billion, and chose to expand its redemption capacity to avoid a complete shutdown.  

This trend is significant because it touches on the very heart of the industry’s recent growth: the channel of high-net-worth investors and wealth management networks. For years, these capital inflows fueled the expansion of private funds and evergreen vehicles. Today, that same capital appears more sensitive, more tactical, and less willing to tolerate uncertainty regarding valuations, sector exposure, or exit timelines.  

The fundamental question is not whether private debt will disappear. It won’t. It remains a significant source of corporate financing and an asset class with a place in diversified portfolios. But the standard of analysis has changed. It is no longer enough to look at yield, seniority, or default history. Now, what matters—and matters a great deal—is how the fund’s liquidity is structured, what percentage of capital can be withdrawn at any given time, and how much the manager depends on retail investor confidence.  

Despite the tension, for now the risk of contagion is not comparable to that of the traditional banking sector. The IMF itself has noted that, although the sector has significant vulnerabilities, the immediate risks to financial stability appear to be contained, and that most private debt funds exhibit little maturity mismatch because they finance long-term loans with long-term capital. The Federal Reserve, in turn, maintains that banks appear well-positioned to absorb any drawdowns on credit lines by these vehicles: even in a hypothetical scenario of sharp drawdowns, the estimated aggregate impact on bank capital and liquidity would be limited. Furthermore, the structure of these funds tends to isolate losses within the vehicle itself: bank lines are typically senior and secured, while investors’ equity and subordinated debt absorb the initial impact. In other words, in a severe scenario, the most exposed would be the investors in those funds—not the financial system as a whole—unless there were an extreme, simultaneous, and much broader shock than what regulators currently anticipate. 

The market is thus entering a new phase. Private debt will continue to play a significant role, with investors taking a more cautious approach to assessing their liquidity needs and placing greater emphasis on the assets they manage, the sectors where funds are concentrated, and underwriting processes. Time will tell how various managers have structured their assets and whether they can remain viable while under pressure. 

 

Esteban Fuentes 
Private Debt Portfolio Manager at Fynsa AGF